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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
KUTV INC., Deseret News Publishing ) 
Company, KSL AM and TV, a Division of ) 
Bonneville International Corporation, ) 
and Society of Professional Journal- ) 
ists, Sigma Delta Chi, Utah Chapter, ) 
Petitioners, 
vs. 
HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER, District 
Judge, and RONALD DALE EASTHOPE, 
Respondents. 
) 
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Case No. 18231 
MEMORANDUM OF PETITIONERS 
KUTV INC. AND DESERET NEWS 
PUBLISHING COMPANY 
Petitioners KUTV Inc. and Deseret News Publishing Com-
pany respectfully submit this Memorandum in support of peti-
tioners' Complaint and Petition for Extraordinary Writ filed 
herein on February 4, 1982. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an original proceeding on KUTV Inc. 's and 
Deseret News Publishing Company's complaint and petition for an 
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extraordinary writ directing the Third Judicial District Court 
for Salt Lake County to vacate an order prohibiting the Utah 
news media from using the term "Sugarhouse Rapist" and/or 
referring to respondent Ronald Dale Easthope's past criminal 
convictions, and for a determination that the District Court's 
order is beyond its authority and contrary to law. 
RELIEF SOUGHT IN THIS COURT 
Petitioners seek an order vacating the Third District 
Court's order prohibiting the Utah news media from using the 
term "Sugarhouse Rapist" or from referring to respondent Ronald 
Dale Easthope's past criminal convictions; Petitioners also 
seek a judgment that the Third District Court's order is or was 
a violation of Petitioners' constitutional rights. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 3, 1982, the first day of respondent 
Ronald Dale Easthope's criminal trial for aggravated sexual 
assault, respondent Honorable Dean E. Conder (hereinafter the 
"District Court") observed an employee of KUTV Inc. in the 
courtroom. The District Court requested that the KUTV employee 
meet in chambers with the Judge, the Prosecutor, the Defendant 
and counsel for the Defendant. Counsel for KUTV was not pres-
ent at this meeting. Outside the presence of the jury, but on 
the record, the District Court issued an order prohibiting the 
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Utah news media from broadcasting, publishing or otherwise con-
veying to the public during the pendency of the trial the term 
"Sugarhouse Rapist" or any information relating to the past 
criminal convictions of Ronald Dale Easthope. 
In 1971, Respondent Ronald Dale Easthope (hereinafter 
the "Defendant") had been charged by police with ten rapes and 
was convicted on two counts of rape, one count of sodomy, and 
one count of aggravated robbery. The term "Sugarhouse Rapist" 
was used by the news media during the Defendant's previous 
trial and subsequent convictions because most of the Defend-
ant's victims lived and were assaulted in the Sugarhouse area 
of Salt Lake City. 
Upon being informed of the District Court's order, 
counsel for KUTV Inc. (hereinafter ''KUTV") requested and was 
granted permission to meet later in the afternoon of Febru-
ary 3, 1982 with the District Court, the Prosecutor, the 
Defendant and counsel for the Defendant. In chambers and off 
the record, the District Court explained that its order was 
motivated by its concern that the Defendant's Sixth Amendment 
right to a fair trial would be jeopardized if the news media 
published information concerning the Defendant's past criminal 
convictions or used the term "Sugarhouse Rapist" in referring 
-to the Defendant. Counsel for KUTV pointed out that the 
Defendant's criminal convictions and the sobriquet "Sugarhouse 
-3-
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Rapist" were matters of public record, 1 and argued that the 
District Court's order constituted an impermissible prior 
restraint. Counsel for KUTV also suggested that the District 
Court could ~dequately protect the Defendant's right to a fair 
trial by imposing other less extreme restrictions, such as 
sequestering the jury or instructing the jury not to avail 
itself of the media during the trial. The District Court, 
after indicating that it had already admonished the jury not to 
read the newspapers, listen to radio news, or watch the news on 
television, denied KUTV's request that the order be vacated. 
KUTV's six o'clock and ten o'clock news programs for February 
3, 1982 were rewritten to comply with the District Court's 
order. 
On February 8, 1982 after a trial in which the Defend-
ant testified that he had previously been convicted and that he 
had been enrolled in a rehabilitation program for sex offend-
ers, the Defendant was found guilty of the crime of aggravated 
sexual assault. 
1 For example, the Deseret News published reports referring 
to the Defendant's past criminal convictions and/or using the 
term "Sugarhouse Rapist" on October 14, 1981; September 24, 
1981; September 23, 1981; July 7, 1977; January 23, 1974; 
August 23, 1973; June 1, 1973; October 21, 1971; July 9, 1971; 
June 23, 1971; March 4, 1971; and February 27, 1971. Simi-
larly, KUTV broadcast news programs referring to the Defendant 
as the "Sugarhouse Rapist" on September 24, 1981; June 15, 
1979; and Juli 7, 1977. 
-4-
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court's order prohibiting the Utah news 
media from referring to the Defendant as the "Sugarhouse 
Rapist" or mentioning the Defendant's prior convictions expired 
of its own terms upon the conclusion of the Defendant's trial. 
Although the District Court's order expired prior to its con-
sideration by this Court, Petitioners' case is not moot because 
it falls into that category of disputes "capable of repetition, 
yet evading review" which the United States Supreme Court has 
ruled exempt from the mootness doctrine. 
Absent extraordinary circumstances not present in this 
case, the District Court may not impose prior restraints upon 
the media's publication of information concerning the defendant 
in a criminal case which are matters of public record. Such 
prior restraints violate the media's First and Fourteenth 
Amendment rights and are contrary to a recognized public policy 
favoring public criminal trials. 
I. 
THE ISSUES IN THIS CASE ARE 
NOT MOOT EVEN THOUGH THE DISTRICT 
COURT'S ORDER HAS EXPIRED 
By its terms the District Court's order prohibiting 
the reporting of Defendant's prior criminal convictions or the 
use of the term "Sugarhouse Rapist" (hereinafter the "Order") 
-5-
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expired upon the conclusion of the Defendant's trial in the 
District Court. The Defendant was convicted five days after 
the District Court issued its Order and four days after the 
Petitioners filed their Complaint and Petition with this 
Court. Despite the fact that the Order has expired, this case 
is not moot. 
As recognized by the United States Supreme Court in 
Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, "jurisdiction is not 
necessarily defeated simply because the order attacked has 
expired, if the underlying dispute between the parties is one 
'capable of repetition, yet evading review'." 427 U.S. 539, 
546 (1976). See also, Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814 (1980); Gannett Co., Inc. v. 
DePasquale, 99 S. Ct. 2898 (1979). 
In the Nebraska Press case, representatives of the 
news media challenged a trial court's order restraining the 
publication or broadcasting of certain confessions and admis-
sions made by the defendant prior to his trial for the murders 
of six family members. Although the trial court's order had 
expired long before the case was considered by the Supreme 
Court, the Court found that the controversy in that case was 
"capable of repetition" in two ways. First, if the defendant's 
conviction were reversed and a new trial ordered, the trial 
court might again impose a restrictive order. Second,· if the 
-6-
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lower court's decision upholding the restrictive order were 
allowed to stand, similar orders might be sought in other crim-
inal cases. "[I]f we decline to address the issues in this 
case on grounds of mootness," stated the Supreme Court, "the 
dispute will evade review in this Court since these orders are 
by nature short-lived." Nebraska Press Association v. 
Stuart, 427 U.S. at 547; see also, Gannett Co., Inc. v. 
DePasquale, 99 S.Ct. at 2904. These rationales articulated by 
the United States Supreme Court apply with equal force to the 
instant case. Consequently, this Court should conclude that 
this case is not moot and that it should be decided on its 
merits. 
II. 
THE FIRST AND FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENTS TO THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION DICTATE THAT 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S ORDER BE 
HELD INVALID AS AN IMPERMISSIBLE 
PRIOR RESTRAINT 
As recently recognized by this Court, "[f]reedom of 
the press and the right to a fair trial are among our most 
cherished values. Any tension between these values is there-
fore difficult to resolve." In re Modification of Canon 
3A(7), 628 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1981). Petitioners submit, 
however, that in this case any "tension" or conflict between 
the two constitutional values can be readily alleviated by 
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remedies considerably less drastic than the judicial censorship 
of public information prescribed by the District Court. This 
Court should condemn the District Court's "gag order" as an 
impermissible prior restraint which negates the Petitioners' 
rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution. 
In Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, a trial 
court, in an attempt to prevent the jurors in a murder trial 
from acquiring potentially inaccurate information about the 
case from the news media, excluded the public and media repre-
sentatives from the courtroom. The publishers of a local 
newspaper contested the closure order, and the United States 
Supreme Court held that "the right to attend criminal trials is 
implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment . . 
Absent an overriding interest articulated in the findings~ the 
trial of a criminal case must be open to the public." 100 S. 
Ct. 2814, 2829-30 (1980). Furthermore, the Supreme Court 
pointed out that unlike a pretrial proceeding, "there exist in 
the context of the trial itself various tested alternatives to 
satisfy the constitutional demands of fairness." Id. at 
2830. Sequestration of the jurors and exclusion of disruptive 
witnesses from the courtroom were both recognized by the 
Supreme Court as acceptable alternatives to closure of the 
trial. "All of the alternatives admittedly present difficul-
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ties for trial courts," stated the Court, "but none of the fac-
tors relied on here was beyond the realm of the manageable." 
Id. 
It is significant to note that in the case at bar, as 
in the Richmond Newspapers case, the trial court's attempt at 
prior restraint arose in the context of a trial setting, rather 
than a pretrial proceeding. Once a jury has been impaneled, 
remedies such as jury sequestration may reasonably be expected 
to obviate any threat that adverse publicity might pose to a 
defendant's right to a fair trial. 
In the instant case, the District Court's Order did 
not prevent the Petitioners from attending the Defendant's 
trial, but rather it suppressed the dissemination of infor-
mation about the Defendant's prior criminal convictions, 
despite the fact that portions of the Defendant's own testimony 
during the trial alluded to his prior convictions for sexual 
offenses. The United States Supreme Court has emphasized, how-
ever, that a trial court's order prohibiting the "reporting of 
evidence adduced at [an] open preliminary hearing . . . plainly 
violated settled principles: '[T]here is nothing that pro-
scribes the press from reporting events that transpire in the 
courtroom'." Nebraska Press Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 
at 568 (quoting Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 362-63 
(1966)). 
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Similarly, in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 
U.S. 469 (1975), the Supreme Court considered a case in which 
the father of a deceased rape victim sought to recover damages 
for invasion of privacy from a broadcasting company which, in 
violation of Georgia law, televised the identity of the victim 
during its coverage of the rapist's trial. After noting that 
the victim's identity was a matter of public court record, the 
Court ruled that "[o]nce true information is disclosed in pub-
lic court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot 
be sanctioned for publishing it." Id. at 496. 
In Nebraska Press and Cox the United States Supreme 
Court decreed that a trial co~rt may not restrict the publica-
tion of pretrial courtroom evidence or public court records. 
Consequently, it is difficult to imagine on what grounds the 
District Court can justify its prohibition against the publica-
tion of information gleaned not only from the court's public 
records but also from files maintained by the news media them-
selves. This is especially true since both this Court and the 
Supreme Court of the United States have ruled that adverse pub-
licity alone does not necessarily prevent a defendant in a 
criminal case from obtaining a fair trial. 
It has often been acknowledged that in extreme circum-
stances, adverse publicity can deprive a defendant in a crimi-
nal case of his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial. See, 
-10-
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!..=..&.:_, Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. 
Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 
(1963); State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d 1338 (Utah 1977); Sinclair 
v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 126, 434 P.2d 305 (1967). As the United 
States Supreme Court admonished in Murphy v. Florida, however, 
these cases "cannot be made to stand for the proposition that 
juror exposure to information about a state defendant's prior 
convictions or to news accounts of the crime with which he is 
charged alone presumptively deprives the defendant of due proc-
ess." 421 U.S. 794, 799 (1975). See also, Nebraska Press 
Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 565 (even "pervasive and 
concentrated" pretrial publicity does not automatically lead to 
unfair trial); State v. Pierre, 572 P.2d at 1349 ("news 
prominance alone [does not] presumptively deprive one of due 
process in a trial setting"). 
It would appear, then, that absent extremely prejudi-
cial circumstances, a defendant in a criminal trial is not 
entitled to insist that he be tried by jurors who have been 
unexposed to pervasive, adverse publicity. Consequently, it 
would be odd indeed if a trial court could, in the absence of 
such extraordinary circumstances, sharply curtail the freedom 
of the press for the purpose of sheltering.a defendant from a 
degree of public comment which the United States Supreme Court 
has found constitutionally unobjectionable. 
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The United States Supreme Court has stressed that 
"prior restraints on speech and publication are the most ser-
ious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment 
rights . . If it can be said that a threat of criminal or 
civil sanctions after publication 'chills' speech, prior 
restraint 'freezes' it at least for the time." Nebraska Press 
Association v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 559. The Court in Nebraska 
Press also stressed that the "authors of the Bill of Rights 
did not undertake to assign priorities as between First Amend-
ment and Sixth Amendment rights . . . . Yet is it nonetheless 
clear that the barriers to prior restraint remain high unless 
we are to abandon what the Court has said for nearly a quarter 
of our national existence and implied throughout all of it." 
Id. at 561. 
It is noteworthy that in a case strikingly similar to 
this one, the Arkansas Supreme Court struck down a trial 
court's order enjoining the news media from referring to the 
accused as the "Quapaw Quarter rapist" in any story published 
prior to trial. In ruling that the trial court's order could 
not pass constitutional scrutiny, the Arkansas supreme court 
echoed the United States Supreme Court when it stated that 
"[a]ny prior restraint bears a heavy presumption against its 
constitutional validity, and the government carries a heavy 
burden of demonstrating justification for its imposition." 
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Arkansas Gazette v. Lofton, 598 S.W.2d 745, 746 (Ark. 1980). 
Petitioners urge this Court, therefore, to conclude that if 
considerations of prejudicial pretrial publicity were insuffi-
cient to justify restrictions against using the term "Quapaw 
Quarter rapist" in Arkansas, a Utah trial court which has 
already impaneled a jury cannot rationally defend its prohibi-
tion against the media's use of the term "Sugarhouse Rapist." 
Moreover, if the Supreme Court's characterization of 
the "barriers to prior restraint" is to have any meaning at 
all, it must describe some obstacle more substantial than that 
shown by the facts in this case. Although the District Court 
surely acted in good faith, Petitioners contend that the Dis-
trict Court's imposition of prior restraint was unjustified by 
the circumstances and is constitutionally deficient. The 
District Court made no findings that other measures short of 
prior restraint -- such as sequestration of the jury -- would 
prove inadequate to protect the Defendant's right to a fair 
trial. Indeed, the District Court did not even enter a finding 
that unsequestered jurors who would be exposed to publication 
of information about the Defendant's past criminal convictions 
or to references to the "Sugarhouse Rapist" would be improperly 
prejudiced against the Defendant. Before a trial court may so 
drastically limit the freedom of the press, it must find, on 
the basis of adequate evidence, that the defendant's Sixth 
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Amendment rights can be protected in no other way. No such 
showing was made here, and as a result, the District Court's 
Order cannot pass constitutional muster. 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court's Order, like those considered by 
the Supreme Court in the Nebraska Press, Gannett and Richmond 
Newspapers cases, was "by nature short-lived." Because con-
troversies concerning such gag orders are "capable of repeti-
tion, yet evading review," this Court should not find Peti-
tioners' case moot, but should decide it on the merits. 
There was no showing in this case that media reports 
of the Defendant's prior criminal record had been or were 
likely to be in any way inaccurate or unduly inflammatory. 
Furthermore, a jury had already been impaneled at the time the 
District Court issued its Order, and the Defendant's right to a 
fair trial could have been adequately protected by the simple 
means of insulating the jury from any publicity appearing in 
the media during the trial. Petitioners ask this Court, 
therefore, to rule that unfounded speculation about the adverse 
effects of future news reports offered the District Court an 
inadequate foothold for surmounting the formidable constitu-
tional barriers to prior restraint. The Order of the District 
Court should be vacated and a determination made that the Order 
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violated Petitioner's rights under the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
Respectfully submitted this 11th day of February, 1982. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & McCARTHY 
r2 
~
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